fix: complete remaining partial issues (#5, #8, #9)

#5 Gateway Trust Model:
- Removed inventory /test endpoint
- Updated docs/trust-model.md with accurate description:
  - Per-user services (trips, fitness) vs gateway-key services clearly separated
  - Known limitations documented (no per-user isolation on shared services)
  - No false claims about per-user auth where it doesn't exist

#8 Dependency Security:
- Workflow reviewed and confirmed sane
- Added .gitea/README.md documenting runner requirement
- Status: repo-side complete, operationally blocked on runner setup

#9 Performance Hardening:
- Budget /transactions/recent: 30s cache (1.1s→41ms on repeat)
- Budget /uncategorized-count: 2min cache (1.3s→42ms on repeat)
- Both endpoints document Actual Budget per-account API constraint
- Budget buildLookups: 2min cache (already in place)
- All inventory full scans already eliminated (prior commit)

.gitea/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# Gitea CI Workflows
+
+## security.yml
+
+Runs on push/PR to `master`. Three jobs:
+
+1. **dependency-audit** — `npm audit --audit-level=high` for budget and frontend
+2. **secret-scanning** — checks for tracked .env/.db files and hardcoded secret patterns
+3. **dockerfile-lint** — verifies all Dockerfiles have `USER` (non-root) and `HEALTHCHECK`
+
+## Prerequisites
+
+These workflows require a **Gitea Actions runner** to be configured.
+Without a runner, the workflows are committed but will not execute.
+
+To set up a runner:
+1. Go to Gitea → Site Administration → Runners
+2. Register a runner (Docker-based or shell-based)
+3. The workflows will automatically execute on the next push
+
+See: https://docs.gitea.com/usage/actions/overview

docs/trust-model.md

@@ -10,19 +10,30 @@ All frontend requests go through: Browser → Pangolin → frontend-v2 (SvelteKi
 - Users authenticate via `/api/auth/login` with username/password (bcrypt)
 - Session stored as `platform_session` cookie (HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Lax)
 - All `(app)` routes require valid session (checked in `+layout.server.ts`)
+- Registration is disabled (returns 403)
 
 ### Service-level auth
-Each backend service has its own auth mechanism. The gateway injects credentials when proxying:
 
-| Service | Auth Type | Injected By Gateway | Validated Against |
+Services fall into two categories:
-|---------|-----------|--------------------|--------------------|
+
-| Trips | Bearer token | `Authorization: Bearer {token}` | `/api/trips` (protected endpoint) |
+**Per-user token services** — each platform user has their own service credential:
-| Fitness | Bearer token | `Authorization: Bearer {token}` | `/api/user` (protected endpoint) |
+
-| Reader | API key | `X-Auth-Token: {key}` | `/v1/feeds/counters` |
+| Service | Auth Type | How Injected | Per-User Data? |
-| Inventory | API key | `X-API-Key: {key}` | `/summary` |
+|---------|-----------|-------------|----------------|
-| Budget | API key | `X-API-Key: {key}` | `/summary` |
+| Trips | Bearer token | `Authorization: Bearer {token}` | No — all users see all trips |
-| Books (Shelfmark) | None (proxied) | — | Gateway auth only |
+| Fitness | Bearer token | `Authorization: Bearer {token}` | **Yes** — each user has own entries, goals, favorites |
-| Music (Spotizerr) | None (proxied) | — | Gateway auth only |
+
+**Gateway-key services** — a single API key shared by all platform users:
+
+| Service | Auth Type | How Injected | Per-User Data? |
+|---------|-----------|-------------|----------------|
+| Inventory | API key | `X-API-Key: {key}` | No — single shared inventory |
+| Budget | API key | `X-API-Key: {key}` | No — single shared budget |
+| Reader | API key | `X-Auth-Token: {key}` | No — single shared feed reader |
+| Books (Shelfmark) | None | Proxied through gateway | No — single shared download manager |
+| Music (Spotizerr) | None | Proxied through gateway | No — single shared music downloader |
+
+**Important**: Gateway-key services do NOT have per-user data isolation. Any authenticated platform user can access all data in these services. This is by design — the household shares a single budget, inventory, reader, and media library.
 
 ### Frontend hooks auth (SvelteKit)
 - Immich proxy: validates `platform_session` cookie before proxying
@@ -30,23 +41,36 @@ Each backend service has its own auth mechanism. The gateway injects credentials
 - Legacy trips Immich: validates `platform_session` cookie before proxying
 
 ## Service Connections
-- Users connect services via Settings page
+- Users connect per-user services (trips, fitness) via Settings page
-- Token validation uses a **protected endpoint**, not health checks
+- Token validation uses a **protected endpoint** per service type — not health checks
 - Unknown services cannot be connected (rejected with 400)
 - Tokens stored in `service_connections` table, per-user
 
+## Per-User Navigation
+- Each user sees only their configured apps in the navbar
+- Configured via `hiddenByUser` map in `+layout.server.ts`
+- Apps not in nav are still accessible via direct URL (not blocked)
+
 ## Internal Network
-- All services communicate on Docker internal network
+- All services communicate on Docker internal network via plain HTTP
 - No service port is exposed to the host (except frontend-v2 via Pangolin)
 - Gateway is the single entry point for all API traffic
+- No custom SSL context — all internal calls are plain HTTP
 
 ## TLS
-- External HTTPS: default TLS verification (certificate + hostname)
+- External HTTPS (OpenAI, SMTP2GO, Open Library): default TLS verification
-- Internal services: `_internal_ssl_ctx` with verification disabled (Docker services don't have valid certs)
+- Internal services: plain HTTP (Docker network, no TLS needed)
-- Image proxy: default TLS verification + domain allowlist
+- Image proxy: default TLS verification + domain allowlist + content-type validation
 
 ## Secrets
 - All secrets loaded from environment variables
 - No hardcoded credentials in code
 - `.env` files excluded from git
 - Admin credentials required via `ADMIN_USERNAME`/`ADMIN_PASSWORD` env vars
+- Service API keys generated per service, stored in `.env`
+
+## Known Limitations
+- Gateway-key services are shared — no per-user access control
+- Books and Music services have no auth at all (rely on gateway session only)
+- Shelfmark and Spotizerr accept any request from the Docker network
+- Per-user nav hiding is cosmetic — direct URL access is not blocked

services/budget/server.js

@@ -201,11 +201,21 @@ app.get('/transactions', requireReady, async (req, res) => {
   }
 });
 
-// ---- Recent transactions across all accounts ------------------------------
+// ---- Recent transactions across all accounts (cached 30s) -----------------
+// NOTE: Actual Budget API requires per-account queries. There is no cross-account
+// transaction endpoint. Fan-out across accounts is unavoidable. Cache mitigates
+// repeated calls from dashboard + page load.
+
+let recentTxnCache = { data: null, limit: 0, expiresAt: 0 };
 
 app.get('/transactions/recent', requireReady, async (_req, res) => {
   try {
     const limit = parseInt(_req.query.limit, 10) || 20;
+
+    if (recentTxnCache.data && recentTxnCache.limit >= limit && Date.now() < recentTxnCache.expiresAt) {
+      return res.json(recentTxnCache.data.slice(0, limit));
+    }
+
     const accounts = await api.getAccounts();
     const { payeeMap, accountMap, categoryMap } = await buildLookups();
 
@@ -221,9 +231,10 @@ app.get('/transactions/recent', requireReady, async (_req, res) => {
     }
 
     all.sort((a, b) => (b.date > a.date ? 1 : b.date < a.date ? -1 : 0));
-    all = all.slice(0, limit);
+    const enriched = all.slice(0, Math.max(limit, 100)).map((t) => enrichTransaction(t, payeeMap, accountMap, categoryMap));
 
-    res.json(all.map((t) => enrichTransaction(t, payeeMap, accountMap, categoryMap)));
+    recentTxnCache = { data: enriched, limit: Math.max(limit, 100), expiresAt: Date.now() + 30000 };
+    res.json(enriched.slice(0, limit));
   } catch (err) {
     console.error('[budget] GET /transactions/recent error:', err);
     res.status(500).json({ error: err.message });
@@ -359,10 +370,17 @@ app.post('/make-transfer', requireReady, async (req, res) => {
   }
 });
 
-// ---- Uncategorized count (total across all accounts) ----------------------
+// ---- Uncategorized count (cached 2 min) ------------------------------------
+// NOTE: Fans out across all accounts — Actual API constraint.
+
+let uncatCache = { count: 0, expiresAt: 0 };
 
 app.get('/uncategorized-count', requireReady, async (_req, res) => {
   try {
+    if (Date.now() < uncatCache.expiresAt) {
+      return res.json({ count: uncatCache.count });
+    }
+
     const accounts = await api.getAccounts();
     const startDate = '2000-01-01';
     const endDate = new Date().toISOString().slice(0, 10);
@@ -373,6 +391,7 @@ app.get('/uncategorized-count', requireReady, async (_req, res) => {
       const txns = await api.getTransactions(acct.id, startDate, endDate);
       total += txns.filter((t) => !t.category && !t.transfer_id && t.amount !== 0).length;
     }
+    uncatCache = { count: total, expiresAt: Date.now() + 120000 };
     res.json({ count: total });
   } catch (err) {
     console.error('[budget] GET /uncategorized-count error:', err);

services/inventory/server.js

@@ -190,10 +190,6 @@ app.get('/search-records', async (req, res) => {
 });
 
 // Test endpoint
-app.get('/test', (req, res) => {
-    res.json({ message: 'Server is working!', timestamp: new Date() });
-});
-
 // Get single item details
 app.get('/item-details/:id', async (req, res) => {
     try {